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Abstract  
The soliciting of personal favours for and from others in order to circumvent formal procedures is a common 
practice across the world, variously known as guanxi, wasta, blat, and jeitinho. Until now, however, there have 
been no known empirical studies of this practice in South-East Europe. This paper fills that gap. The aim is to 
evaluate the extent to which personal connections are used to circumvent formal procedures, and who engages 
in such practices in FYR Macedonia. Reporting data collected from 2,014 face-to-face interviews undertaken 
in late 2015, the finding is that 35 per cent of respondents had used vrski during the year prior to the survey, 
particularly to gain access to health services and find a job. Using logistic regression analysis, the population 
groups significantly more likely to have used vrski are found to be younger people, higher income groups, 
those who also both supply and purchase undeclared work, live in rural areas or villages, while those in the 
Eastern, Southeastern and Pelagoni regions are less likely to do so than those in the Vardar region. The paper 
concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications along with the future research required. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Receiving and providing personal favours in order to circumvent formal procedures 
prevails in all countries and regions of the world to varying degrees. This is variously 
referred to as guanxi in China (Chen et al. 2011, 2013; Luo 2011; Yang and Wang 2011), 
wasta in Arab countries (Smith et al. 2011), jeitinho in Brazil (Ardichvili et al. 2010; 
Ferreira et al. 2012), ‘pulling strings’ in the English-speaking world (Smith et al. 2012), 
blat in post-Soviet societies (Ledeneva 2008, 2009, 2013), veze in Serbia, vruzki in 
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Bulgaria, and vrski in FYR Macedonia. The reason that this practice is important to 
understand is because it prevents the emergence of meritocratic processes and instead, 
leads to the persistence of nepotism, cronyism, and corruption in countries. Until now, 
however, and despite its study elsewhere in the world, there have been no known 
empirical studies of its usage in South-East Europe. To fill this gap, therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to evaluate the prevalence and distribution of vrski in FYR Macedonia.    
In the first section, therefore, a review of the existing literature is undertaken on the 
use of personal connections to circumvent formal procedures. This will display that 
although the use of personal connections to circumvent formal procedures has been 
evaluated in various countries, there has been little if anything in South-East Europe and 
no empirical studies conducted in FYR Macedonia. To fill this gap, the second section 
introduces a study of the use of vrski in FYR Macedonia based on 2,014 face-to-face 
interviews undertaken in late 2015. Reporting the findings, the third section reveals the 
prevalence of vrski and who uses it, using a logistic regression analysis. The final section 
then draws conclusions and discusses how these anti-meritocratic practices might be 
eradicated.   
 
 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
All countries have to produce, distribute and allocate goods and services and therefore, 
all countries have an economy of some type. This production, distribution and allocation 
of goods and services can be organised using either the ‘market’ (private sector), ‘state’ 
(public sector) and/or ‘community’ (informal or third) sectors (Giddens 1998; Gough 
2000; Polanyi 1944; Thompson et al. 1991). Conventionally, these are seen as separate 
spheres. However, when one examines the use of personal connections to circumvent 
formal procedures, it becomes quickly apparent that they are not separate spheres. Such 
personal connections display how the informal realm permeates the private and public 
sectors.  
Indeed, social networks have been widely studied and viewed as resources that people 
use to meet their needs. Traditionally, moreover, the tendency has been to draw attention 
to the beneficial effects of the help provided by and for close ties (Stack 1974; Young 
and Wilmott 1975).  Recent decades, furthermore, has seen the social capital literature 
also highlight the beneficial effects of the ties forged between people who do not know 
each other very well (Putnam 2000), or what Granovetter (1973) calls the ‘strength of 
weak ties’. The resultant focus has been on the positive effects of the help provided by 
and for both close ties (i.e. ‘bonding’ social capital) as well as the weaker ties between 
people who do not know each other well (i.e. ‘bridging’ social capital) (Gittell and Vidal 
1998; Putnam 2000). 
A smaller stream of scholarship, nevertheless, has discussed how social capital can 
also have a negative ‘darker side’ (Ayios et al. 2014; Garigiulo and Benassi 1997; Gu et 
al. 2008; Putze, 1997; Schulman and Anderson 2009). This literature displays how the 
use of social networks can also result in nepotism (i.e., favouritism to kin), cronyism 
(i.e., helping acquaintances and friends), and/or corruption (i.e., the use of public office 
for private gain), as well as hinder meritocracy (Ayios et al. 2014).   
An exemplar of this ‘dark side’ of social capital is the use of personal connections to 
circumvent formal procedures. In China, guanxi (‘connections’) describes a network of 
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contacts from whom favours are received so as to access a good or service, or to bypass 
bureaucratic procedures, which must then be reciprocated in the future (Hsuing 2013; 
Mikhailova and Worm 2003). Indeed, the literature on guanxi displays that it is 
extensively used in Chinese business and culture (Luo 2011; Luo et al. 2011; Shou et al. 
2014; Zhan 2012). Although there have been studies showing its negative effects, such 
as when there is nepotism in job recruitment (Chen et al. 2011), most of the studies on 
guanxi simply see it as an unavoidable feature of life that must be recognised when doing 
business in China (Chen et al. 2013; Munro et al. 2013; Yang and Wang 2011; Zhuang 
et al. 2010).   
In the Arab world meanwhile, wasta is the term most commonly used to denote the 
connections rooted in family and kinship ties that enable a sidestepping of formal 
procedures (Smith et al. 2011), or ma’arifa in North African nations such as Tunisia, 
Algeria and Morocco (Mellahi and Wood 2006; Yahiaoui and Zoubir 2006). Most of 
these studies in the Arab world again display a neutral or even positive attitude towards 
its use (Bailey 2012; Barnett et al. 2013; Kilani and Sakijha 2002; Mohamed and 
Mohamed 2011; Tlaiss and Kauser 2011), exemplified by a ‘no nepotism’ policy being 
absent in the Arab business world and favouritism widely employed in hiring and 
promotion decisions rather than meritocratic processes.  
In Brazil and other Portuguese speaking countries, the term commonly used is either 
pistolao (‘contacts’) or jeitinho (‘find a way’) which again, is viewed in a positive 
manner as a helpful coping practice (Ardichvili et al. 2010). English-speaking countries, 
meanwhile, use the term ‘pulling strings’, which usually refers to obtaining favours from 
longstanding links with influential persons, often based on family connections or shared 
schooling (Smith et al. 2012). Indeed, a cross-national comparative study of attitudes 
towards the use of connections to circumvent formal procedures reveals that English 
people view this practice even more positively than the Chinese, Arabs and Brazilians 
(Smith et al. 2012).  
In the post-Soviet world, this use of personal networks to obtain goods and services 
in short supply, or circumvent formal procedures, is commonly termed blat (Arnstberg 
and Boren 2003; Ledeneva 2006, 2008, 2009, 2013; Mikhailova and Worm 2003; Smith 
et al. 2011). In the Soviet command economy, money had relatively little value given the 
shortages of goods to purchase, so it was important to have a wide network of friends 
and acquaintances to call upon in times of need, and a common phrase during Soviet 
times was ‘it is better to have a hundred friends than a hundred roubles’. Blat, therefore, 
was used to negotiate most aspects of everyday life, including the acquisition of everyday 
goods such as food, arranging periodic events such as holidays, and organising life-cycle 
events such as obtaining kindergarten and university places. For this reason, blat in its 
traditional meaning was widely viewed in a positive or neutral manner because it enabled 
people to deal with the inefficiencies of the command economy. Indeed, blat was an 
important status symbol and a source of pride and prestige for those able to use their 
connections to help others (Williams et al. 2013). Few therefore regarded this as a corrupt 
practice (Williams et al. 2013). Today, in contrast, it is argued that connections are still 
used to gain preferential access to services in post-Soviet societies, but that connections 
and access to assets are increasingly treated as a commodity, with gifts and/or money 
received and given for this (Ledeneva 2009, 2013 Onoshchenko and Williams 2013, 
Williams and Onoshchenko 2014a, b). Al Ramahi (2008) has noted a similar trend in 
relation to wasta. Indeed, this is reflected in recent studies. Take, for example, the study 
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of informality in health services. Rather than study blat, studies now focus upon the 
informal payments made to access medical services (Gordeev et al. 2014; Kaitelidou et 
al. 2012; Stepurko et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2016).  
In South-East Europe, meanwhile, such connections are variously referred to as veze 
in Serbia, vruzki in Bulgaria and vrski in Macedonian. Until now, there has been hardly 
any scholarly literature on this practice, with the notable exception of Chavdarova (2013) 
who has discussed vruzki in Bulgaria, and no known empirical studies of the prevalence 
and usage of connections in South-East Europe. Despite this, the use of connections to 
circumvent formal procedures is widely and openly discussed in popular culture and 
often at the heart of many critiques by Macedonians of how their society operates. Such 
connections are often viewed as creating significant privileges for individuals connected 
to the ruling powers and state apparatus, as well as to private firms and their owners. 
However, it is also sometimes seen more positively as a way of helping ordinary people 
to get things done. Until now, nevertheless, empirical studies of the prevalence and 
distribution of vrski in contemporary Macedonian society are notable by their absence. 
Below, therefore, we report a survey which seeks answers to the following two questions: 
what is the prevalence of vrski in contemporary Macedonian society? And which 
population groups are most likely to use vrski? 
 
 
2. DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
 
2.1. Data 
 
To evaluate the prevalence and distribution of vrski in contemporary Macedonian 
society, data is reported from 2,014 face-to-face interviews conducted in FYR 
Macedonia in late 2015. This survey included questions on whether respondents used 
and provided favours to circumvent formal procedures, and the spheres in which they 
did so, and as part of the wider survey, whether they had participated in the undeclared 
economy.  
To collect this data, a multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was 
used to ensure that on the issues of gender, age, region and locality size, the national 
level sample, as well as each level of the sample, was representative in proportion to its 
population size. In every household the ‘closest birthday’ rule was applied to select 
respondents, while every subsequent address was determined by the standard ‘random 
route’ procedure.  
 
 
2.2. Variables 
 
To evaluate the use of vrski, the dependent variable used is a dummy variable with 
recorded value 1 for employees who answered ‘yes’ to the question: “Have you in the 
last 12 months asked anyone for a favour/help using connections in any of the following 
spheres?”, and zero otherwise if they had not used vrski. The spheres analysed were: 
medical services (skipping queue, getting better examination, surgery); solving problems 
with the law enforcing authorities (traffic police, customs); finding a job; education 
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(places in higher education/ obtaining degree/diploma etc.); legal services and courts; 
everyday services at better quality or better price (e.g., bank services, hairdressers); 
repairs (housing, garages, car); tickets for events, theatre, concerts; hobbies and 
entertainment, tourist resorts, travel tickets; consumer goods excluding foodstuffs; 
communicating with local authorities on business matters (e.g. delaying tax payment); 
foodstuffs; speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at the municipal hall), and any 
other realms. This enabled the degree to which it is used in each of these spheres to be 
analysed.  
To evaluate the distribution of vrski, meanwhile, the following independent variables 
were analysed, derived from wider studies evaluating the associated issue of the important 
socio-demographic and socio-economic variables influencing participation in undeclared 
work (Williams and Horodnic 2015a, b, 2016; Williams and Padmore 2013a, b):  
 Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for men and 1 for women; 
 Age: an interval variable indicating the exact age of the respondent; 
 Household size: a categorical variable with value 1 for one person, value 2 for 
two persons, value 3 for three persons, and value 4 for four and more persons; 
 Net income from formal work: a categorical variable with value 1 for less than 
€350, value 2 for €350–699, value 3 for €700–999, and value 4 for €1000 or more; 
 Working on an undeclared basis: a dummy variable with value 0 for those not 
working on undeclared basis and value 1 for those working on undeclared basis; 
 Purchasing undeclared goods and services: a dummy variable with value 0 for 
those not purchasing on undeclared basis and value 1 for those purchasing on 
undeclared basis; 
 Type of locality: a categorical variable with value 1 for rural area or village, value 
2 for small or middle-sized town, value 3 for large town;  
 Region: a categorical variable with value 1 for Vardar, value 2 for Eastern, value 
3 for Southwestern, value 4 for Southeastern, value 5 for Pelagoni, value 6 for 
Polog, value 7 for Northeastern and value 8 for Skopje. 
Given that there were a large number of missing values and inconclusive answers 
(i.e., refusal and ‘don’t know’) across the dependent and independent variables, multiple 
imputation was used to predict the values. This is done using a system of chained 
equations for each variable with missing values, with 25 imputations simulated for each 
missing value. Furthermore, population weights are applied based on age and gender to 
correct for under- and over-representation in the sample.  
To analyse its usage in different realms, descriptive statistics are presented. To 
evaluate who is significantly more likely to use vrski in contemporary Macedonian 
society, a logistic regression analysis is undertaken. Below, the results are reported.  
 
 
3. FINDINGS 
 
Examining the nationally representative sample of 2,014 respondents interviewed face-
to-face in late 2015 in FYR Macedonia, just 2 per cent held the view that the use of vrski 
was not important in order to get things done. Some 10 per cent asserted that it is 
somewhat important, 29 per cent that it is important, and 59 per cent that it is very 
important. This is reflected in the findings on whether they used vrski to get things done. 
Indeed, asked about their views on using connections (vrski), the majority (57 per cent) 
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were overall negative about its usage, with 27 per cent adopting a neutral stance and just 
16 per cent adopting a positive view of using connections to get things done.  
Yet despite this, 35 per cent of respondents had used vrski in the last 12 months in 
order to bypass formal procedures. Analysing the spheres in which the respondents had 
used vrski to get things done, Table 1 (Authors’ own calculations based on the 
representative survey of 2,014 individuals in Macedonia) reveals that 18.2 per cent of all 
participants surveyed had used vrski to gain access to medical services (e.g., jumping the 
queue, getting a better examination), 9.3 per cent to find a job, 8 per cent to get repairs 
(e.g., to their home or car), 7 per cent to solve problems with the law enforcement 
authorities such as the traffic police or customs, 6.8 per cent to speed up bureaucratic 
procedures with the public administration, and 6.5 per cent to gain access to everyday 
services such as hairdressers and bank services.   
When it is recognised that not all respondents needed to obtain these services in the 
past 12 months (e.g., medical services, finding a job, solving problems with the law 
enforcement authorities), vrski appears to be commonly used to get things done. Indeed, 
for future research, enumerating whether respondents had engaged with these realms in 
the past year before asking them whether vrski had been used, would be useful in order 
to evaluate the proportion of instances in which vrski is used. Here, therefore, it can only 
be tentatively concluded that vrski seems to be very commonly used when gaining access 
to medical services, finding a job, dealing with legal services and the courts, and 
accessing education, which are activities that only a relatively small proportion would 
have accessed in the year prior to the survey, and less commonly used when acquiring 
foodstuffs and consumer goods, which are activities that most would have engaged in 
during the year prior to the survey. 
 
Table 1. The use of personal connections to bypass formal procedures in FYR Macedonia: by 
sphere, % of surveyed respondents 
Sphere Receive favours Provide favours  
Yes No Refusal 
/DK 
Yes No Refusal 
/DK 
Medical services: skipping queue, getting better 
examination, surgery 
18.2 77.4 4.5 8.2 88.6 3.1 
Finding a job 9.3 86.3 4.4 7.7 88.6 3.8 
Repairs (housing, garages, car) 8.0 88.7 3.3 5.4 91.7 2.9 
Solving problems with the law enforcing 
authorities: traffic police, customs 
7.0 88.1 4.9 3.4 92.1 4.5 
Speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. at 
the municipal hall) 
6.8 89.8 3.4 2.8 93.9 3.3 
Everyday services at better quality or better 
price (bank services, hairdressers…) 
6.5 89.7 3.9 4.0 92.9 3.2 
Legal services and courts 4.5 91.3 4.2 2.7 93.9 3.4 
Education: places in higher education/ obtaining 
degree/diploma etc. 
4.4 92.1 3.6 2.9 93.3 3.7 
Foodstuffs 4.0 92.8 3.3 3.0 94.2 2.9 
Hobbies and entertainment, resorts, travelling 
tickets 
3.8 93.3 2.9 2.9 94.5 2.6 
Tickets for events, theatre, concerts 3.5 92.8 3.7 3.1 94.1 2.8 
Consumer goods excl. foodstuffs 2.8 94.3 2.9 2.7 94.7 2.6 
Communicating with local authorities in your 
business matters (e.g. delaying tax payment) 
2.6 94.0 3.4 1.6 95.7 2.7 
Other 1.3 98.7 0.1 0.9 98.9 0.2 
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Some 8.2 per cent of participants, moreover, had made arrangements for somebody 
they knew to gain access to medical services either due to their direct control over these 
assets or more usually by acting as a third party to help them establish contact with a 
relevant person. Similarly, 7.7 percent had helped somebody find a job, 5.4 per cent to 
gain access to somebody who could do repairs (e.g., car or home repairs). The reason for 
the lower supply-side figure is that participants are likely to be able to provide favours 
in a limited range of spheres (mostly the areas in which he/she works or those areas in 
which s/he knows somebody and can act as a third party in gaining access), but can 
receive vrski in almost any sphere depending on the breadth of his/her connections.  
Who, therefore, uses vrski in order to get things done in FYR Macedonia? And who 
does favours for others? Table 2 (Authors’ own calculations) reports the results of a 
logistic regression analysis which investigates whether individual socio-demographic, 
socio-economic and spatial variables are significantly associated with engagement when 
other variables are taken into account and held constant. Starting with who receives 
favours in order to bypass formal procedures, model 1 examines the socio-demographic 
variables. This reveals that there are no significant gender variations in the use of vrski. 
Neither are there any significant variations according to household size in terms of the 
number of adults. However, age does have a significant influence on its usage; younger 
age groups are more likely to use vrski than older age groups.  
When socio-economic variables are included in model 2, the findings regarding the 
socio-demographic variables remain the same. The additional finding is that the higher 
is the personal formal net income of a respondent, the more likely they are to use vrski 
to get things done. Those receiving favours to bypass formal procedures, therefore, are 
significantly more likely to be the affluent rather than poor. So too is there a strong 
significant correlation between receiving help due to vrski and participation in the 
undeclared economy. Those receiving help due to vrski are significantly more likely to 
also purchase undeclared goods and services and to supply undeclared work.  
Model 3 adds in spatial variables. The finding is that signs and significances of the 
socio-demographic and socio-economic variables remain the same. The additional 
finding is that use of vrski is also significantly higher in rural areas and villages than in 
more urban areas, and there also significant regional variations in its usage. Those in the 
Eastern, Southeastern and Pelagoni regions are less likely to do so than those in the 
Vardar region. 
Turning to who does favours for others, the finding in Table 3 (Authors’ own 
calculations) is that very similar patterns are identified as when who uses personal 
connections to bypass formal procedures. The finding in model 1 is again that gender 
and household size are not significantly associated with the giving of favours but younger 
people are significantly more likely to do so than older generations. As model 2 reveals, 
so too are higher income earners significantly more likely to do favours for others, as are 
those who supply and purchase undeclared work, perhaps reflecting that those not 
abiding by the laws and regulations of the state with regard to paying taxes, social 
contributions and abiding by labour laws, is similarly the case when it comes to 
bypassing formal procedures by receiving and doing favours for personal connections. 
Model 3, moreover, reveals that similar spatial variations exist regarding who is more 
likely to do favours for others. It is again those living in rural areas and villages rather 
than those in more urban areas, and regional variations again exist. However, here it is 
only those in the Southeastern region who are less likely to provide favours to others 
Colin C. Williams and Slavko Bezeredi. 2017. Evaluating the Use of Personal Connections to Bypass Formal 
Procedures: A Study of Vrski in Republic of Macedonia. UTMS Journal of Economics 8 (2): 169–182. 
 
 
 
 
176 
than those in the Vardar region, indicating that the provision of favours to others is more 
evenly distributed regionally than the receipt of favours. 
 
Table 2. Logistic regression analysis of the use of personal connections to bypass formal 
procedures in FYR Macedonia 
Coefficient (Standard error) 
Receive favours 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female -0.163 (0.099)* -0.003 (0.103)  0.018 (0.106) 
Age -0.012 (0.003)*** -0.012 (0.003)*** -0.009 (0.004)*** 
Household size (RC: one person)    
 Two persons -0.063 (0.194) -0.093 (0.198) -0.100 (0.200) 
 Three persons  0.103 (0.205)  0.154 (0.210)  0.146 (0.213) 
 Four and more  0.013 (0.191) -0.001 (0.196) -0.026 (0.198) 
Net income for formal work (RC: Less than 350 
EUR) 
   
 350-700 EUR   0.114 (0.139)  0.125 (0.143) 
 700-1000 EUR   0.430 (0.148)***  0.381 (0.154)** 
 More than 1000 EUR   0.474 (0.160)***  0.395 (0.169)** 
Supply undeclared work   1.140 (0.236)***  1.028 (0.241)*** 
Purchase undeclared goods and services   0.794 (0.138)***  0.911 (0.146)*** 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area or village)    
 Small or middle sized town    -0.779 (0.212)*** 
 Large town    -0.055 (0.121) 
Region (RC: Vardar)    
 Eastern   -0.561 (0.267)** 
 Southwestern    0.137 (0.244) 
 Southeastern   -0.643 (0.262)** 
 Pelagoni   -0.683 (0.258)*** 
 Polog    0.149 (0.240) 
 Northeastern    0.313 (0.291) 
 Skopje   -0.222 (0.223) 
Const 0.120 (0.265) -0.412 (0.280) -0.260 (0.349) 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.057 0.083 
Area under ROC 0.579 0.652 0.692 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 3. Logistic regression analysis of the giving of personal connections to bypass 
formal procedures in FYR Macedonia 
Coefficient (Standard error) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female -0.184 (0.112) -0.037 (0.116) -0.037 (0.119) 
Age -0.010 (0.004)*** -0.011 (0.004)*** -0.007 (0.004)* 
Household size (RC: one person)    
 Two persons -0.075 (0.229) -0.115 (0.230) -0.151 (0.232) 
 Three persons  0.242 (0.243)  0.265 (0.242)  0.229 (0.248) 
 Four and more  0.048 (0.229)  0.020 (0.227) -0.005 (0.233) 
Net income for formal work (RC: Less 
than 350 EUR) 
 
  
 350-700 EUR   0.15  (0.164)  0.144 (0.169) 
 700-1000 EUR   0.427 (0.170)**  0.366 (0.177)** 
 More than 1000 EUR   0.657 (0.174)***  0.599 (0.184)*** 
Supply undeclared work   0.839 (0.220)***  0.686 (0.230)*** 
Purchase undeclared goods and 
services 
  0.594 (0.146)***  0.655 (0.152)*** 
Type of locality (RC: Rural area or 
village) 
 
  
 Small or middle sized town    -0.547 (0.250)** 
 Large town    -0.163 (0.128) 
Region (RC: Vardar)    
 Eastern   -0.235 (0.295) 
 Southwestern   -0.100 (0.287) 
 Southeastern   -0.971 (0.331)*** 
 Pelagoni   -0.382 (0.302) 
 Polog    0.282 (0.272) 
 Northeastern   -0.319 (0.347) 
 Skopje    0.006 (0.263) 
Const -0.691 (0.316)** -1.170 (0.329)*** -1.048 (0.418)** 
Number of observations 2,014 2,014 2,014 
Number of imputations 25 25 25 
Prob > F 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.045 0.063 
Area under ROC 0.572 0.644 0.677 
Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
To provide a more graphical portrait of these findings regarding who is more likely 
to receive and give favours in order to bypass formal procedures, Figure 1 present the 
predicted probabilities of a representative Macedonian citizen receiving and giving 
favours to circumvent formal procedures, according to their age and whether they 
purchase and supply undeclared work. This ‘representative’ worker is defined using 
mean and modal values of the remaining predictors. That is to say, the representative 
citizen is a woman living in a household with three persons, with a net income between 
€350–699 per month, living in a large town and the Skopje region. This reveals that the 
probability of the representative citizen who purchases and supplies undeclared work is 
greater that they give and receive favours than for the representative citizen who does 
not purchase or supply undeclared work. For those receiving favours, for example, the 
probability of doing so ranges from 25 in a 100 for the oldest citizens who do not 
purchase undeclared goods and services to 62 in a 100 for the youngest citizens who also 
supply undeclared work. Similarly, when doing favours for others, the probability ranges 
from 18 in a 100 for the oldest citizens who do not purchase undeclared goods and 
services to 42 in a 100 for the youngest citizens who also supply undeclared work. 
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Figure 1. Predicted probability of the use of personal connections for a 
representative’ Macedonian citizen: by age and participation in the undeclared 
economy 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has evaluated the prevalence of the practice of using personal connections to 
bypass formal procedures, known as vrski, in FYR Macedonia and who gives and 
receives such favours. Reporting a survey of 2,014 respondents conducted in late 2015, 
the finding is that 35 per cent of respondents had used vrski in the past 12 months to get 
things done, particularly when accessing medical services or finding a job. Using logistic 
regression analysis, the population groups significantly more likely to have both used 
and given favours via vrski so as to bypass formal procedures are younger people, higher 
income groups, those who also both supply and purchase undeclared work, live in rural 
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areas or villages, while those in the Eastern, Southeastern and Pelagoni regions are less 
likely to do so than those in the Vardar region.  
 Theoretically, therefore, and when explaining the use of vrski, this paper has revealed 
that there is a strong statistically significant correlation between the use of vrski and 
participation in the undeclared economy, intimating that those who do not accept and 
abide by the laws and regulations of the state are more likely to receive and give favours 
that bypass formal procedures. This can be explained using the lens of institutional theory 
(Baumol and Blinder 2008; North 1990). From an institutionalist perspective, all 
societies are viewed as having both formal institutions, which are codified laws and 
regulations that define the legal rules of the game, as well as informal institutions, which 
are the ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727). 
Adopting this institutional lens, the use of personal connections to circumvent formal 
procedures therefore arises when the norms, values and beliefs of citizens are not in 
symmetry with the codified laws and regulations. The greater the level of asymmetry, 
the greater will be the use of vrski, as has been also found when studying participation 
in undeclared work (Williams and Franic, 2016; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, b; 
2017). This suggests that tackling the asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions is necessary in order to tackle this endeavour.   
How, therefore, can this illicit practice be tackled? Several policy options are 
available. Firstly, governments can pursue its eradication using tougher penalties, 
although whether the political will exists to do this remains open to question. Secondly, 
it can be also tackled by reducing the asymmetry between formal and informal 
institutions. On the one hand, this can be achieved by seeking to change the norms, values 
and beliefs of citizens (i.e., the informal institutions) regarding the acceptability of this 
illicit practice, such as by running awareness raising campaigns about the negative 
consequences of vrski and the positive consequences of adopting meritocratic processes 
across Macedonian society. On the other hand, it can also be pursued by modernising the 
formal institutions so as to reduce the formal institutional inefficiencies and 
imperfections that lead to vrski being used. None of these are mutually exclusive 
approaches, and can be sequenced in various ways such as by organising an awareness 
raising campaign alongside modernising public services so as to reduce the 
circumvention of formal procedures, and then following this up with tougher penalties 
for those who still engage in these practices that result in nepotism, cronyism and 
corruption. Whether this is the appropriate sequencing has not so far been evaluated.  
What is certain, nevertheless, is that the use of vrski cannot continue in a modern 
meritocratic society and doing nothing is not an option. If this paper therefore stimulates 
research on its prevalence and distribution across a wider array of countries, as well as 
greater debate on what needs to be done to eradicate this practice, then it will have 
achieved its intention. 
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